Showing posts with label market design. Show all posts
Showing posts with label market design. Show all posts

Monday

Paul Klemperer on the product mix auction, and market design (video)

How geometry came to the rescue during the banking crisis - video

"Economist Paul Klemperer of Oxford University describes how he invented an auction based on a new kind of geometry to help the Bank of England as the financial crisis took hold in 2007. The auction got money to the banks and building societies that needed it most urgently. The then governor Mervyn King later called it 'a marvelous application of theoretical economics to a practical problem of vital importance'. Klemperer describes how similar auctions can help other government departments allocate resources.  The video featured as the Editor's Choice on the Guardian on 12th July 2013."

Thursday

McKay lecture at Pitt on Market Design

If you're in Pittsburgh, I'll be giving the McKay Lecture at my old home, the Department of Economics at Pitt.

Market Design: The Economist as Engineer




February 27, 2014 - 3:30pm to 5:00pm
The University of Pittsburgh Department of Economics proudly presents the 2014 McKay Lecture "Market Design: The Economist as Engineer" by Alvin Roth, Nobel Laureate in Economics.
Market design is an ancient human activity but a relatively new part of economics.  It seeks to understand how the design of markets and marketplaces influences their performance, to use this growing understanding to fix markets when they're broken, and to help to establish markets where they are missing. 
Mr. Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Standord University and the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus at Harvard University.  From 1982 to 1998, he was the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Economics at Pitt.  He shared the 2012 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.
Roth directed the redesign of the National Resident Matching Program, through which 23.000+ doctors a year find their first employment.  He also has helped to reorganize the market for more senior physicians as they pursue subspecialty training. He helped to design the matching systems for students in several large American cities.   He is among the founders and designers of kidney exchange in the United States (along with a number of colleagues with Pittsbugh connections), which helps incompatible patient-donor pairs to find lifesaving compatible kidneys for transplantation.

Location and Address

University of Pittsburgh
Frick Fine Arts Building
650 Schenley Drive
Pittsburgh, PA  15260

Directions and Parking Information

on street parking and Soldiers & Sailors Garage

Tuesday

The Marshall Lectures at Cambridge, Feb 19-20

THE MARSHALL LECTURES for 2013-2014


Professor Alvin Roth

(Stanford and Harvard University)

will deliver two lectures
on
"Matching Markets and Market Design"
in the
Lady Mitchell Hall
at 5 pm
on Wednesday 19 February
and
Thursday 20 February
A question and answer session will follow the second lecture
All Welcome

Suggested Readings

Roth, Alvin E., "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics", Fisher-Schultz Lecture, Econometrica, 70,4, July 2002, 1341-1378.

Roth, Alvin E. "What have we learned from market design?" Hahn Lecture, Economic Journal, 118 (March), 2008, 285-310.

Roth, Alvin E. "What have we learned from market design? Update to Roth (2008)", September, 2010 in El Trimestre Economico.

Thursday

Venture capital looks at the design of marketplaces

Not long ago I had a chance to listen to some interesting presentations at a conference sponsored by Greylock Partners, about businesses that aim to make marketplaces: As Marketplaces Evolve, Greylock Places Its Bets

  writes:
"The idea of marketplaces as a business model for technology startups isn’t new. We saw some marketplaces go belly up in the bubble, and saw a few, like eBay, grow into massive businesses. However, the marketplace model has experienced a renaissance of sorts lately, with companies like Airbnb, Uber and others gaining serious traction and becoming billion-dollar-plus businesses.
Greylock Partners held a conference in mid-November devoted to talking about design, product development, the economics and more around marketplaces, spearheaded in part by the firm’s newest partner and former eBay Motors creator, Simon Rothman.
As part of its new $100 million commitment to investing in marketplaces, Greylock assembled Reid Hoffman, Airbnb co-founder and CEO Brian Chesky, eBay CEOJohn Donahoe, Nobel Prize Laureate and marketplace expert Alvin Roth, and many others to discuss the rise of marketplaces and much more. I was able to sit down with some of the speakers to talk about their thoughts on why marketplaces are hot right now.
Hoffman, who founded LinkedIn and was an early investor in Facebook, sees many parallels between networks and marketplaces. On the similarities in both models, he says: “There’s a question of how do you identify people? What reputational systems underlie it? What kinds of information and signaling? What kind of transactions go public? There’s some differences, too, but it’s essentially a similar brain activity.”
As for why marketplaces are getting more attention now, Hoffman believes that it’s in part due to mobile and the progression in human behavior. “Now everyone is comfortable with the notion of, ‘Oh, I could actually find someone I don’t know and transact with them, either as travelers, hosts, sellers, buyer.’ Those that can actually work mean that I have some trust in these mechanisms,” he explains further.
Rothman agrees with Hoffman, and told me that trust is a huge element of why marketplaces have evolved, as well as the biggest challenge for these marketplaces. “They’re really selling trust. And until the web adds social identity, I think creating trust at scale is really hard. As we’ve heard, marketplace is about influence, and if you can’t control the experience, if you can’t control the product, you can’t control the fulfillment. All you can control is trust and you need to have that. And then mobile is an accelerant to that. If you are a local market, or a local business, you have to have mobile. There’s just no way Uber works without mobile,” he says.
...
So how do marketplaces add trust? Hoffman advises to look at mechanisms by which you can essentially borrow some trust and add it to the product, such as using social networks or identities. He recalled a product development from his PayPal days, where an engineer developed a better way to authenticate bank accounts.
For years, in order to authenticate a bank account you had to send in a voided check, and a copy of your drivers license. PayPal realized that if they wanted to get to scale, the company would have to make it easier to create accounts. “If we can’t solve this problem, we basically don’t have an interesting business model,” he said. One of the early engineers developed a way to send two sub-dollar transactions to the account, to create a PIN of sorts for instant verification.

While friction is something most marketplaces want to remove, Rothman argues that some should consider “the concept of strategic friction” when it comes to trust and safety. He thinks it’s one of the only places where friction is not only tolerable but kind of desirable.
...
"Hoffman says that Airbnb was creating liquidity out of space. Even if the hosts didn’t own their real estate, the liquidity involved is “hugely valuable and motivating to them.” So, they’ll adopt mobile products, and go through hoops to make that happen. “There was no question that this is going to work,” he says. 
...
Now that Greylock is allocating some of its new $1 billion in funding toward the marketplace model, we’ll be looking to see where the firm will be placing its bets. Rothman thinks that in the next five years there will be more $1 billion dollar marketplaces than there were in the past 20 years, and we already have quite a few that are rising fast. Stay tuned."

Wednesday

Webcast of the luncheon talks on market design from the 2014 AEA Annual Meeting

The AEA has posted a collection of webcasts from the 2014 annual meeting in Philadelphia, including from the
Nobel Laureate Luncheon
William Nordhaus; Paul Milgrom; Roger Myerson 
View Webcast

The video is a little less than an hour: and consists of brief introductions by Nordhaus, and talks on market design and its history by Milgrom and Myerson, and a short talk by me with some thoughts on the future of market design as economic engineering and the science that supports it.  (spoiler: I think it will be important to study congestion...)
**************

Eleven 2014 Annual Meeting sessions are available online. (I enjoyed Claudia Goldin's magisterial address on gender and jobs, which reminded me of the work following up on this and the matching aspects of pursuing both careers and marriages, of our joint student Stephanie Hurder.):
  •    AEA Presidential Address "A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter" (Claudia Goldin)
  •    AEA Awards Ceremony (William Nordhaus)
  •    Richard T. Ely Lecture "Retirement Security in an Aging Population" (James Poterba)
  •    Nobel Laureate Luncheon (Paul Milgrom, Roger Myerson, and Alvin Roth)
  •    AEA/AFA Joint Luncheon (Jeremy Stein)
  •    Chairman Bernanke Presentation (Ben Bernanke, Kenneth Rogoff, and Anil Kashyap)
  •    What's Natural? Key Macroeconomic Parameters after the Great Recession
  •    Discounting for the Long Run
  •    Financial Globalization
  •    Climate Change Policy after Kyoto
  •    Macroeconomics of Austerity

Monday

Ricky Vohra's class in market design at Penn

Ricky Vohra is teaching market design at Penn, and describes it on his blog: Graduate Market Design Class (2nd Try)

Here's the reading list

Topics & Papers
1. IPOs
Jaganathan and Sherman: Why do IPO Auctions Fail
Ritter: Equilibrium in the IPO market
Background Reading (to be read by all)
Ljungqvist: IPO Underpricing: A Survey
Ritter and Welch: A review of IPO activity, pricing and allocations

2. Health Care & Insurance Markets
Cochran, J: Time Consistent Health Insurance, JPE 1995.
Cochran, J. : After the ACA: Freeing the market for health care
Fang & Gazzara: Dynamic Inefficiencies in an Employment-Based Health Insurance System: Theory and Evidence
Handel, Hendel and Whinston: Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection vs. Reclassification Risk
Levine, Kremer and Albright: Making Markets for Vaccines
Kremer: Creating Markets for New Vaccines Part 1: rationale
Kremer: Creating Markets for New Vaccines Part 2: design issues 
Background Reading (to be read by all)
Rothschild, M. & J. Stiglitz: Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, QJE 1976.
Fang, H: Insurance Markets in China
3. Market for Cybersecurity Insurance
Kesan, Majuca & Yurcik: Cyberinsurance as a market based solution to the problem of cybersecurity

4. Affirmative Action
Hickman: Effort, Race Gaps and Affirmative Action: A Game Theoretic Analsyis of College Admissions
Chung: Affirmative Action as an Implementation Problem
Fryer and Loury: Valuing Identity: The simple economics of Affirmative action policies
Background Reading (to be read by all)
Fang and Moro: Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative Action: a survey

5. Assigning Counsel
Friedman & Schulhofer: Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants

6. The Role of Politics
Acemoglu: Why not a political Coase theorem?
Acemoglu: Modeling Inefficient Institutions

Wednesday

Video of market design talk at USF

Not long ago I gave a talk at the University of San Francisco. My host was Professor Ludwig Chincarini, and he has posted this video of my lecture:

Monday

D47. Market Design is now officially a field of study

I returned last night from Philadelphia where the American Economic Association’s annual meeting was held. While I was there, my Pittsburgh colleague Asatoshi Maeshiro informed me that Market Design has arrived. In particular, the AEA publishes the Journal of Economic Literature, which classifies articles according to what field they are in. And the newest JEL Classification Codes include market design, under the overall heading of Market Structure and Pricing.  We’re D47.

•        D4          Market Structure and Pricing
•        D40        General
•        D41        Perfect Competition
•        D42        Monopoly
•        D43        Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
•        D44        Auctions
•        D45        Rationing; Licensing
•        D46        Value Theory
•        D47 Market Design

•        D49        Other

When you click on microeconomics, followed by market structure, followed by market design on the JEL classification webpage, you get to this description of the new field, with example (which are clickable on the web page, but don't seem to be when I copy them...:

D470 Market Design
Guideline: Covers studies concerning the design and evolution of economic institutions, the design of mechanisms for economic transactions (such as price determination and dispute resolution), and the interplay between a market�s size and complexity and the information available to agents in such an environment.
Keywords: Markets, Microeconomic Engineering, Price Formation, Quasi-markets
Caveats: Purely theoretical studies concerning mechanism design should be classified in D82. Purely empirical studies concerning market structure should be classified in the appropriate category under L1.
Examples:

Sunday

Market design today in Philadelphia

Two sessions I'll be attending at today's AEA meetings...


Jan 05, 2014 8:00 am, Pennsylvania Convention Center, 204-C 
American Economic Association
Frontiers of Market Design (D4)
Presiding: ALVIN ROTH (Stanford University)
The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response
ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)
PETER CRAMTON (University of Maryland)
JOHN SHIM (University of Chicago)
[View Abstract]
Organ Donation Loopholes Undermine Warm Glow Giving: An Experiment Motivated By Priority Loopholes in Israel
ALVIN E. ROTH (Stanford University)
JUDD KESSLER (University of Pennsylvania)
[View Abstract]
Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy
MICHAEL KEARNS (University of Pennsylvania)
MALLESH PAI (University of Pennsylvania)
AARON ROTH (University of Pennsylvania)
JONATHAN ULLMAN (Harvard University)
[View Abstract]
Strategy-Proofness, Investment Efficiency, and Marginal Returns: An Equivalence
JOHN WILLIAM HATFIELD (Stanford University)
FUHITO KOJIMA (Stanford University)
SCOTT DUKE KOMINERS (University of Chicago)
[View Abstract]
Discussants:
MICHAEL OSTROVSKY (Stanford University)
JAMES ANDREONI (University of California-San Diego)
ILYA SEGAL (Stanford University)
LARRY SAMUELSON (Yale University)

Jan 05, 2014 10:15 am, Pennsylvania Convention Center, 204-A 
American Economic Association
Market Design for Auction Markets (D7)
Presiding: PAUL MILGROM (Stanford University)
The VCG Auction in Theory and in Practice
HAL VARIAN (Google)
CHRIS HARRIS (Google)
[View Abstract]
Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
LAWRENCE AUSUBEL (University of Maryland)
OLEG BARANOV (University of Colorado)
[View Abstract]
The Continuous Combinatorial Ascending Price Auction
CHARLES R. PLOTT (California Institute of Technology)
[View Abstract]
Deferred Acceptance Heuristic Auctions and United States Spectrum Repurposing
PAUL MILGROM (Stanford University)
ILYA SEGAL (Stanford University)
[View Abstract]
Discussants:
ALVIN E. ROTH (Stanford University)
TAYFUN SONMEZ (Boston College)